William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 5

Article 6

2004

The Supreme Court and Trademark law in the New
Millennium
David S. Welkowitz

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Welkowitz, David S. (2004) "The Supreme Court and Trademark law in the New Millennium," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 30:
Iss. 5, Article 6.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss5/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Welkowitz: The Supreme Court and Trademark law in the New Millennium
WELKOWITZ-FORMATTED

7/20/2004 6:49:44 PM

THE SUPREME COURT AND TRADEMARK LAW
IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
David S. Welkowitz†
I. TRADEMARK LAW IN THE OLD MILLENNIUM ....................... 1660
A. The Earliest Years....................................................... 1660
B. The Twentieth Century: Pre-Lanham Act....................... 1664
C. The Twentieth Century: Post-Lanham Act ..................... 1669
II. TRADEMARK LAW IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM ....................... 1676
A. Wal-Mart .................................................................. 1676
B. TrafFix ..................................................................... 1679
C. Moseley ..................................................................... 1681
D. Dastar ...................................................................... 1685
III. THE LESSONS OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM ............................ 1687
A. The Paradigm Shift .................................................... 1687
B. Some Implications of the New Trademark Paradigm ........ 1690
C. The Effect on Lower-Court Jurisprudence ....................... 1695
D. Speculation about the KP Permanent Case................... 1697
IV. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 1700
Depending on how you count, we are now in the fourth or
fifth year of the new millennium. Ordinarily, one would think that
it is too early to make lofty pronouncements about Supreme Court
jurisprudence in this millennium, or even this century. And
perhaps it is. However, at least in trademark law, the dawning of
the new millennium has seen a significant quickening of the pace
and importance of trademark cases in the Supreme Court. If we
measure the new millennium from the year 2000 (the first year
beginning with a “2”), a year marking an important shift in
trademark law, there have been four Supreme Court trademark
cases already decided, with a fifth one in the pipeline. Considering
that in the last fifty years of the twentieth century trademark law
had been somewhat of a backwater in the Supreme Court’s docket,
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this development represents a markedly increased interest in this
area of law. Moreover, as will be seen, these cases appear to signify
a shift in attitude by the Court about trademark law, or at least
about the general direction of trademark law.
The Supreme Court’s four trademark opinions this
millennium have three critical factors in common: (i) all four
1
decisions were unanimous; (ii) all four decisions reversed the
decision of a court of appeals; and (iii) all four decisions took a
narrow view of the protective umbrella afforded by the trademark
laws. The clarity of these results is striking—obviously, the Court is
sending a message. One part of the message is clear: the Court is
unhappy with the expansive view of trademark protection put forth
by many lower courts. This unhappiness appears to stem from the
Court’s conviction that trademark law remains an offshoot of unfair
competition rather than a subset of intellectual property law. But a
further explication of the Court’s new millennium message
requires that we explore its jurisprudence in the previous
millennium.
We will begin with that discussion, and then move on to a
discussion of the “new millennium” cases.
I. TRADEMARK LAW IN THE OLD MILLENNIUM
A. The Earliest Years
Although trademarks have been traced back several hundred
years, fortunately for us the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this
area does not stretch quite that far. We begin in the nineteenth
2
century, with the celebrated opinion in In re Trade-Mark Cases. In
that case, the Court held the Trademark Act of 1870 (as amended
in 1876) to be beyond the constitutional bounds of Congress’s

1. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion in one case, but he also
joined the opinion of the Court. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418,
435 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Scalia declined to join the portion
of the Moseley opinion discussing legislative history. See id. at 420 n.*. Justice
Breyer did not participate in the last case, Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003).
2. 100 U.S. 82 (1879). The decision in In re Trade-Mark Cases was not the
Court’s first trademark opinion. For example, just seven years earlier, the Court
decided Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311 (1872), where the Court denied relief to
the first seller of “Lackawanna” coal against a competitor using the same
geographic name, which accurately described its origin.
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3

power. One may be tempted to dismiss the Trade-Mark Cases as
representing the Court’s narrow late-nineteenth-century view of
Congress’s commerce power, rather than a view about trademark
4
law. But I believe that would ignore some interesting aspects of
the opinion. The 1870 trademark statute was part of a statute
entitled “An Act to revise, consolidate, and amend the statutes
5
relating to patents and copyrights.” Evidently, Congress assumed it
had the power to regulate trademarks as a “necessary and proper”
adjunct to its power to regulate the traditional areas of intellectual
6
property, namely patents and copyrights. But the Court did not
agree. In its view, a trademark did not look like a patent:
The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to
invention or discovery. The trade-mark recognized by the
common law is generally the growth of a considerable
period of use rather than a sudden invention . . . and
when under the act of Congress it is sought to establish it
by registration, neither originality, invention, discovery,
science, nor art is in any way essential to the right
7
conferred . . . .
Nor did a trademark look like a copyright:
[W]hile the word writings may be liberally construed . . . it
is only such as are original, and are founded in the creative
powers of the mind. The writings which are to be
protected are the fruits of intellectual labor, embodied in the
form of books, prints, engravings, and the like. The trademark may be, and generally is, the adoption of something
already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the party
using it. At common law the exclusive right to it grows out
of its use, and not its mere adoption. By the act of
Congress this exclusive right attaches upon registration.
But in neither case does it depend upon novelty,
invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires
no fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought.
It is simply founded on priority of appropriation. We look
in vain in the statute for any other qualification or
3. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 99.
4. See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868) (“Issuing a policy of
insurance is not a transaction of commerce.”).
5. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92.
6. Id. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the Patents and Copyrights Clause).
The statute at issue provided that trademarks would be registered with the Patent
Office. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92.
7. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94.
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condition. If the symbol, however plain, simple, old, or
well-known, has been first appropriated by the claimant as
his distinctive trade-mark, he may by registration secure
8
the right to its exclusive use.
Only after exhausting these possibilities did the Court
examine, but reject, the possibility that the statute might be
9
sustained under Congress’s commerce power. Thus, trademarks
were left as a kind of outlier in the world of intellectual property,
protected by common law, but not the same species of property as
patents and copyrights. Less than a decade later, in a very short
opinion in another case, the Court reiterated its belief that the
grounding of trademark law is in deception, not in a strong
10
proprietary interest.
The end of the nineteenth century (1896 to be precise)
11
brought another landmark, the Singer case,
which further
solidified the Court’s skepticism about expansive notions of
trademark law. Singer was the most prominent manufacturer of
sewing machines of its era. However, when the patents on various
elements of Singer’s machines expired in the 1870s, competition
12
appeared.
The defendant, a competitor of Singer’s,
manufactured its machines to look like those of Singer (even
placing a “dummy” screw on the machine where the Singer-made
13
machines had a still-patented tension screw device). In addition,
the defendant marked and advertised its machines as “Improved
14
Singer” machines. The principal issue, therefore, was whether the
shape of the machines and the name “Singer” were generic
15
designations.
Viewed from a modern perspective, one can criticize the
manner in which the Court reached its conclusion in Singer that the
form and the name were both generic. But that is not the point of
this discussion, which is to understand the underlying
jurisprudence, or mindset, of the Court at the time. Thus, we leave
8. Id. at 94.
9. Id. at 97-98.
10. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. Finzer, 128 U.S. 182, 184 (1888) (denying
relief citing, inter alia, differences in the “star” designs used by each party, as well
as lack of evidence of confusion).
11. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896).
12. See id. at 174-77.
13. Id. at 177.
14. Id. at 176-77. The defendant’s trade name also appeared on the
machines. Id.
15. Id. at 178.
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to others the extended critique of Singer’s reasoning, and only seek
to discern its message.
Considering first the claim as to the form or appearance of the
machines—an issue that would reappear in the Court’s first two
“new millennium” cases—the Court dismissed Singer’s contentions
with very simple (perhaps even simplistic) reasoning.
The
machines were covered by patents, and the expiration of the
patents essentially precluded the claim:
It is self evident that on the expiration of a patent the
monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to
make the thing formerly covered by the patent becomes
public property . . . . It follows, as a matter of course, that
on the termination of the patent there passes to the
public the right to make the machine in the form in which it
was constructed during the patent. We may therefore dismiss
without further comment the complaint as to the form in
16
which the defendant made his machines.
Notice that the italicized portion does not refer to the form in
which the patent required the machine to be made, but simply the
17
form used by the company that owned the patent.
As to the “Singer” name, the Court held that the expiration of
the patent necessarily gave the public the right to use
the generic designation of the thing which has arisen
during the monopoly in consequence of the designation
having been acquiesced in by the owner, either tacitly, by
accepting the benefits of the monopoly, or expressly by
his having so connected the name with the machine as to
lend countenance to the resulting dedication. To say
otherwise would be to hold that, although the public had
acquired the device covered by the patent, yet the owner
of the patent or the manufacturer of the patented thing
had retained the designated name which was essentially
necessary to vest the public with the full enjoyment of that
which had become theirs by the disappearance of the
monopoly.
In other words, that the patentee or
manufacturer could take the benefit and advantage of the
patent upon the condition that at its termination the
monopoly should cease, and yet when the end was

16. Id. at 185 (emphasis added).
17. The above statement is tempered by the Court’s earlier statement
indicating that the patents gave the Singer machines “as a whole, a distinctive
character and form.” Id. at 179.
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reached, disregard the public dedication and practically
18
perpetuate indefinitely an exclusive right.
What is notable about this analysis is the Court’s expressed fear
that the patent owner might use trademark or unfair competition
law to extend indefinitely the practical life of the patent. Thus, at
least where another form of intellectual property was directly
implicated, the Court appeared unwilling to permit trademark law
to become a functional substitute for that other form of protection.
Of course, as the Court’s ultimate decree recognized, the right
to compete by using the form of the machines and the generic
designation “Singer” was not unlimited.
Finding that the
defendant had not marked its machines with a sufficiently
prominent disclosure of the actual source of manufacture, and that
some of defendant’s advertisements did not adequately disclose the
true source of the goods, the Court ordered an accounting of
19
defendant’s wrongfully obtained profits.
But the finding was
based on a desire to protect the public from deception, and did not
alter the foundation of the Court’s opinion that the form of the
20
machines and the “Singer” name were dedicated to the public.
B. The Twentieth Century: Pre-Lanham Act
In the first half of the twentieth century, the Court actually
decided a relatively large number of trademark cases. Many were
not of lasting consequence, but a few set standards that remain to
this day.
Reviewing these cases, we see that the limited view of
trademark protection expressed in Singer and the Trade-Mark Cases
continued into the first half of the twentieth century. As early as
1901, the Court refused to allow protection to the Elgin Watch
Company, which was based in Elgin, Illinois, against the use of the
“Elgin” name on watch cases made by other manufacturers also
21
located in Elgin. The Court found that the Elgin name primarily
signified a place of manufacture, and therefore could not operate

18. Id. at 185-86.
19. Id. at 200-04.
20. This distinction would resurface in Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305
U.S. 111 (1938), Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964), and Compco
Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
21. Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 677
(1901).
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22

as a trademark. Two better-known opinions of this era are the
23
Hanover Star Milling and Rectanus duo from 1916 and 1918,
respectively, in which the Court limited the protection of the first
user of a trademark to the geographic area in which its trademark
was used or known, thus providing a safe haven for the so-called
good-faith remote junior user who had built up a trade in a
24
particular location without knowledge of the prior user. Again,
the focus of these cases was on unfair competition and deception,
not on an absolute property right (which would have favored
granting the senior user absolute priority over any junior users).
These two decisions were followed by a number of less critical
decisions, leading up to the next “big” case, Kellogg Co. v. National
25
Biscuit Co. These intermediate cases, while not always favoring the
26
most-restrictive reading of trademark protection possible,
included some opinions notable for restricting the scope of
27
trademark protection. In Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, for instance, the
Court permitted the use of the Coty trademark on repackaged
powder and perfume (at least as long as the label truthfully
indicated the repackaging).
In American Steel Foundries v.
28
Robertson, the Court refused to extend trademark protection to
the word “simplex” because “simplex” was part of the name of a
29
different company that registered the word on other products.
But it was Kellogg that truly set the tone for the pre-Lanham Act era.
22. Id.
23. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); United Drug
Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
24. Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 415, 419-20; Rectanus, 248 U.S. at 98-100.
25. 305 U.S. 111 (1938). Shortly before Hanover Star Milling and Rectanus the
Court decided G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co., 237 U.S. 618 (1915), in
which one publisher sought to prevent another publisher from using “Webster’s
Dictionary” as a designation for its book. In a passage reminiscent of the Singer
opinion, the Court stated the following:
After the expiration of a copyright [in the dictionary], it is well settled
that the further use of the name by which the publication was known
and sold under the copyright cannot be acquired by registration as a
trademark, for the name has become public property, and is not
subject to such appropriation.
Id. at 622.
26. See, e.g., A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923) (enjoining sale of
grey market goods purchased from a genuine source in France). The broad
potential of the Bourjois case would be limited somewhat in scope over a halfcentury later in K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
27. 264 U.S. 359 (1924).
28. 269 U.S. 372 (1926).
29. Id. at 382-84.
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Kellogg was very much like Singer, in both form and substance.
National Biscuit Company (Nabisco) sued Kellogg, claiming
primarily that Kellogg’s use of “shredded wheat” as the name for its
cereal, and its production of the product in a pillow shape like
30
Nabisco’s own product, constituted unfair competition. Rejecting
Nabisco’s claims, the Court strongly reaffirmed the principles
enunciated in Singer. In fact, when discussing the name “shredded
wheat” (which it found generic), the Court quoted the passage in
Singer holding the Singer name to be generic and referring to the
problem of generic name monopolization resulting from a patent
31
monopoly on production. Discussing Kellogg’s right to produce
shredded wheat in a pillow shape, the Court quoted the passage
32
from Singer relating to expired patents. Finally, as in Singer, the
Court considered Kellogg’s obligation to avoid confusion. Unlike
Singer, it found that Kellogg had taken adequate steps to avoid
33
confusion. Nevertheless, the principles of Singer were all present
in Kellogg. Kellogg did add an important rhetorical and doctrinal
message in the following passage:
Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill
of the article known as “Shredded Wheat”; and thus is
sharing in a market which was created by the skill and
judgment of [Nabisco’s] predecessor . . . . But that is not
unfair. Sharing in the goodwill of an article unprotected
by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right possessed
by all—and in the free exercise of which the consuming
34
public is deeply interested.
Although this is not fundamentally different from the
sentiment expressed in Singer, the reference to “goodwill” is
important. It elevates the interests of the consuming public above
the “sweat of the brow” of the company whose efforts may have
brought the product to the marketplace, and whose market is now
being taken, in part, by a competitor who is able to profit from
another’s initial investment in the product.
The importance of this last passage is best seen in light of
30. Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 113.
31. Id. at 118.
32. Id. at 120 (quoting Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185
(1896)). See supra text accompanying note 16 for the quoted passage.
33. Id. at 120-22 (finding sufficient distinctiveness in the size and shape of the
biscuit, the prominence of the Kellogg name, and the size, form, and color of the
packaging).
34. Id. at 122.
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another well-known but non-trademark case, International News
35
In that case, the Court upheld an
Service v. Associated Press.
injunction against International News Service (INS) for
“misappropriation” of Associated Press’s (AP’s) news stories, as INS
allowed its members to publish West Coast newspapers using stories
36
taken from the East Coast newspapers of AP members.
The
Court’s opinion included the oft-quoted passage that INS should
37
not be permitted to “reap where it has not sown,” in effect
denying INS the right to trade on AP’s goodwill. International News
Service was decided over a vigorous dissent by Justice Brandeis, the
38
author of the Kellogg opinion (some twenty years later). Thus, the
quoted passage in Kellogg presumably serves multiple purposes. It is
a not-so-subtle measure of revenge by Justice Brandeis against a
case with which he disagreed, and it is a forceful reminder that the
misappropriation doctrine does not mean that copying and sharing
in the goodwill of a market created by another is necessarily
39
unfair—indeed, it may be presumptively fair competition. This is
important, and not just for trademark law. The misappropriation
mantra—that one should not “reap where one has not sown”—is a
powerful one in intellectual property law. Indeed, in a case like
Kellogg, a strong urge exists to protect a market created and
nurtured by one company from the seemingly “predatory” actions
of a competitor.
That urge also exists in the four “new
millennium” cases discussed below, all of which involve attempts to
protect the “goodwill” built up over time by plaintiffs against
various perceived encroachments by defendants. Kellogg provides a
powerful rhetorical and doctrinal counterpoint to the urge to
40
protect competitors from perceived acts of misappropriation.
Kellogg set standards that endure to this day, even in the post35. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). This case mainly deals with copyrightability of news
information.
36. Id. at 230-31.
37. Id. at 239.
38. Id. at 248 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
39. The dissenters in Kellogg clearly believed that by sharing in shredded
wheat’s goodwill, Kellogg was competing unfairly. Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 123
(McReynolds & Butler, JJ., dissenting). Neither Justice Brandeis nor Justice
McReynolds cited the International News Service case.
40. There are, of course, differences between Kellogg and International News
Service. In the latter, competition and the public were arguably best served by
prohibiting the conduct because it threatened AP’s ability to compete at all. In
most cases, however, consumers are better served by having competition, which
can result in a lower price and/or a better product.
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Lanham Act era. It was, perhaps, the apex of the Supreme Court’s
twentieth-century trademark jurisprudence, given the number of
principles it enunciated and the thoughtful treatment those
principles received.
41
One might be tempted to see the Mishawaka decision five
years later as a partial repudiation of Kellogg’s broad statement that
competitors can share in the goodwill of a product, even if created
by the sweat of another. However, that would be a mistake.
Mishawaka involved an infringement suit against a manufacturer of
42
replacement heels for shoes.
The plaintiff complained that
defendant’s replacement heels contained a red plug virtually
43
identical to that used by plaintiff in the original heels. Justice
Frankfurter’s opinion for the Court contains a frequently quoted
passage about the value of trademarks:
The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by
making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the
market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol.
Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same—to
convey through the mark, in the minds of potential
customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which
it appears. Once this is attained, the trade-mark owner has
something of value. If another poaches upon the
commercial magnetism of the symbol he has created, the
44
owner can obtain legal redress.
This strong statement about trademark law protecting
“commercial magnetism” must be tempered by two important facts.
First, the issue of infringement (and, specifically, what might
constitute infringement) was not before the Court—only the issue
of the proper remedy was to be decided. Second, Justice
Frankfurter wrote only for a four-person majority; only seven
Justices participated in the case, and they were divided four to
three.
Thus, Mishawaka’s place in the Court’s trademark
jurisprudence can be, and probably has been, easily
overemphasized.
A final first-half-of-the-century-long foray into trademark law
45
was Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, which was consistent with
41.
(1942).
42.
43.
44.
45.

Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203
Id. at 203-04.
Plaintiff evidently did not manufacture replacement heels. Id.
Id. at 205.
331 U.S. 125 (1947).
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the general tenor of most of the Court’s earlier opinions. Written
by Justice Douglas (who dissented in Mishawaka), the opinion
acknowledges the right of a competitor to use the trademark of
another when selling reconditioned versions of the other’s goods—
in this case, reconditioned spark plugs—as long as consumers are
told the truth about the nature of the goods and the source of the
46
reconditioning.
The Court provided some relief for the
47
trademark owner, namely, requiring truthful disclosure. But the
defendant had not challenged this relief before the Court, and the
Court rejected the plaintiff’s entreaty for further protection and
48
damages. Champion reiterates a general theme running through
the earlier cases that trademark law is, at its core, aimed at
deception. Where there is no deception, both Kellogg and
Champion decided that trademark law offers no protection.
Shortly after Champion, the Trademark Act of 1946, commonly
49
known as the Lanham Act, became effective. The Lanham Act
was the first trademark statute to actually federalize trademark
50
law. In many respects, the Lanham Act codified existing common
law principles, including some enunciated in the major Supreme
Court opinions discussed above. In other respects, the statute
extended the common law, creating a degree of uniformity and
protection previously unknown to trademark law. For the first
time, a national trademark was a reality in law.
The
implementation of the Lanham Act, which conveniently occurred
almost halfway into the twentieth century, is an appropriate
dividing line for a discussion of Supreme Court jurisprudence in
trademark law.
C. The Twentieth Century: Post-Lanham Act
The enactment of a comprehensive federal trademark statute
might have been expected to engender a spate of Supreme Court
cases interpreting the new law. Paradoxically, quite the opposite
46. Id. at 130.
47. Id. at 131-32.
48. Id. Denying an accounting, the Court distinguished the Mishawaka case.
Id. at 131.
49. The Act, named after its long-time sponsor, Representative Fritz Lanham,
went into effect on July 5, 1947. Lanham Trademark Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427
(1946) (codified and amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1128 (2000)).
50. Following the In re Trade-Mark Cases, other statutes were enacted, but they
did not fundamentally alter trademark law, which continued to be governed
largely by the common law.
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occurred. For four decades following the statute’s passage, the
Supreme Court appeared willing to allow lower courts to shoulder
the burden of interpreting and, in many cases, expanding the
scope of protection afforded by the statute. The Court stepped
into trademark law only very occasionally, largely to sort out
relatively minor differences among the courts. In 1952, for
example, it held that the Lanham Act could be used to reach
conduct by United States citizens occurring in another country
51
where significant effects were felt in the United States. In 1964,
the Court obliquely referred to trademark in the Sears-Compco
52
cases. It rejected claims that the lighting fixtures at issue in those
cases had “secondary meaning” and could be protected
53
notwithstanding their expired patents. Thus, Sears-Compco simply
reiterated the pre-Lanham Act idea that trademark law could not
fill the gaps left by patent law. In 1967, the Court dealt with a fairly
54
minor aspect of monetary remedies under the Lanham Act. By
the time the Court truly returned to trademark law, most of the
landscape had been carved out by lower courts, in a manner fairly
protective of trademarks.
The Court did not return to trademark until the 1980s. Its
55
first real trademark case upon its return was the Ives case in 1982.
Ives was primarily a case about contributory trademark
infringement. Generic drug manufacturers were accused of
supplying pills in a color and shape that allegedly facilitated illegal
56
substitutions for branded drugs. Although it was thought that in
this case the Supreme Court might finally venture a serious opinion
about trademark law, the result was rather less-than-satisfying in
that regard. The real holding of Ives was that the court of appeals

51. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286 (1952). It is perhaps
noteworthy that in Steele, the Court described the Lanham Act as “complex and
controversial,” id. at 283 (footnotes omitted), and seemed almost relieved that the
case did not require it to interpret the substantive provisions of the statute.
Indeed, in footnotes accompanying this statement, the Court listed a number of
discussions pertaining to that complexity and controversy. Id. at nn.6-7.
52. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
53. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 232; Compco, 376 U.S. at 238.
54. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717
(1967) (holding that there is no right to attorney’s fees under the Lanham Act).
The statute now permits such recoveries in “exceptional cases.” Lanham Act
§ 35(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000).
55. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
56. Id. at 846-49.
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had failed to give proper deference to the district court’s findings
57
In passing, the Court set forth what it assumed were
of fact.
58
commonly accepted standards for contributory infringement and
59
functionality, without engaging in an extended discussion of
60
Ultimately, Ives provided little insight into the Court’s
either.
61
thinking about trademark law.
Three years later, the Court took up another case, Park ’N Fly,
62
Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc. Here, the issue was the proper
63
evidentiary status afforded to “incontestable” trademarks.
The
Ninth Circuit had ruled that incontestability was only a shield
against cancellation, and could not be used to foreclose a defense
that the mark was merely descriptive and had no secondary
64
meaning. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, viewing
the case as calling for a straightforward application of the plain
65
language of the statute. The statute did not make the distinction
drawn by the Ninth Circuit; indeed, the statutory defenses to
66
incontestability did not include “descriptiveness.” Moreover, the
Court found some support in the legislative history for its
57. Id. at 855-58.
58. Id. at 853-54.
59. Id. at 850 n.10.
60. Justice White, concurring, expressed concern that the Court had
acquiesced in a reduced burden on the plaintiff for showing contributory
infringement, id. at 860-62 (White, J., concurring), though the Court disagreed.
Id. at 854 n.13. In any event, Justice White’s opinion, which provides a more
extensive analysis of contributory infringement, expressed concern lest
contributory infringement give overbroad protection, especially to branded drugs.
Id. at 861.
61. See, e.g., An Analysis of the Ives Case: A TMR Panel, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 118,
118-20, 140 (1982). At one point in the discussion, a panelist stated: “I do not
believe that this case will stand for any significant proposition of trademark or
unfair competition law which would not, or ought not, have stood before this
decision.” Id. at 140.
62. 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
63. See id. at 191. See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115 (2000) (listing the
conditions for granting and the effects of incontestable status). Essentially, after a
mark has been registered and in constant use for five years, the registrant may, by
filing the proper affidavit, gain “incontestable” status, id. § 1065, meaning that the
registrant is conclusively presumed to have the exclusive right to use the mark on
the goods and services for which it is registered. Id.§ 1115.
64. Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 192-93. A merely descriptive mark cannot be
registered without “secondary meaning,” which means it cannot be registered
without showing that the relevant public regards it as a source identifier and not
simply as a description of the goods or services. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e), (f)
(2000).
65. Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 205.
66. Id. at 196.
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conclusion that this omission was not accidental.
It did not
question the wisdom of Congress’s choice, leaving that to legislative
68
69
action. Only Justice Stevens dissented. He thought it improper
to afford incontestable status to a merely descriptive mark,
registration of which he assumed resulted from an error by the
70
Patent and Trademark Office.
Moreover, he feared the
overprotection of “words or phrases that are a part of our common
vocabulary,” stating that “[l]anguage, even in a commercial
context, properly belongs to the public unless Congress instructs
71
otherwise.”
Although Park ’N Fly ultimately took the position most
favorable to trademark protection, it did not involve a major public
policy interface with trademark law. The case foreclosed one door
to challenging incontestable marks, but many others remained.
The case did not alter the direction of trademark law in any
meaningful way. The Court’s next foray into trademark law,
however, did involve an interface between trademark law and
public policy, but the Court was either unaware of its implications
or chose to ignore them.
Seven years passed before the Court’s next important
72
trademark case. The Two Pesos case posed the question whether
67. Id. at 196-97.
68. See id. at 202 (asserting that the dissent simply disagrees with the balance
struck by Congress).
69. See id. at 206-20.
70. Id. at 207, 212 (Stevens, J., dissenting). That may not be so. The mark
could have had weak secondary meaning when registered, but then reverted to
merely descriptive status later.
71. Id. at 215 (citations omitted) (Stevens, J. dissenting). His citations are
interesting, one of which is a pre-Lanham Act case from the nineteenth century,
Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 323-24 (1872), which reiterated the fear
of over-protecting descriptive terms as marks. Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 215 n.21.
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Park ’N Fly may presage his thinking in the KP Permanent
case currently before the Court, which raises the issue of the breadth of the
“descriptive fair use” defense of § 33(b)(4). See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v.
Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct.
981 (2004). This case is discussed infra Part III.D.
72. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). Five years
before Two Pesos, the Court did have occasion to comment on a trademark-related
problem, in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Committee, 483
U.S. 522 (1987). In that case, the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a
special statute (section 110 of the Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 380) that gave
the United States Olympic Committee exclusive rights in the word “Olympic” in
most commercial contexts. See id. at 540-41. Although primarily a first
amendment case, the Court’s opinion noted, and did not disturb, the broad
trademark protection granted to the USOC by the statute, which was very similar
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an “inherently distinctive” trade dress could be protected without
73
any showing of secondary meaning. The case was brought under
§ 43(a) of the Lanham Act because the “mark” at issue, the decor
74
of a restaurant, was not registered. Unlike the statutory sections
in Park ’N Fly, § 43(a) is broadly worded, so that its language alone
75
could not dictate a result. However, in the absence of Supreme
Court guidance, over the previous forty years the lower courts had
steadily expanded the reach of § 43(a), creating a large
background for the Court’s decision. Rather than reassessing that
background, the Court simply accepted it as settled law and
proceeded, almost perfunctorily, to apply the existing paradigm to
the case before it. Thus, the Court accepted the hierarchy of marks
76
created by the Second Circuit —arbitrary/fanciful, suggestive,
77
descriptive, generic—and applied it mechanically to a restaurant.
The problem, of course, is that the hierarchy (based on a
distinction between “inherently distinctive” and other marks) was
developed for word marks, and is not necessarily well-suited for
78
testing whether the decor of a restaurant should be protectable.
The Court never really considered the differences between trade
dress and word marks, saying only that nothing in § 43(a) (a
broadly worded statute that does not even use the word
to that provided by trademark dilution statutes. See id. at 539.
73. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 764-65. A mark that is inherently distinctive is
deemed capable of acting as a source identifier without any showing that the
public actually recognizes it as such (i.e., without secondary meaning). See id. at
769. Generally speaking, “merely descriptive” marks (those that simply describe
the goods or services) are not considered inherently distinctive and therefore
require a showing of secondary meaning to be protected. See id. Generic terms
cannot be protected as trademarks, even if there is a showing of secondary
meaning. Id. at 768 (citations omitted).
74. See id. at 765.
75. Compare Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (creating
liability “in connection with any goods or services or any container for goods, uses
in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof”) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115. See supra text accompanying note 63.
76. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773-74 (citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976)).
77. See id. at 773-76.
78. As the Court would later note, some trade dress can be denominated as
“descriptive,” such as a green can for lime soda. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) (stating, in dicta, that orange color of
marmalade was not source identifier). The doctrine of functionality can be used
to smooth out some of the anticompetitive edges in the protection of trade dress.
See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 774-75. But these obscure the more fundamental
problems that a secondary meaning requirement could create for small
companies. Id.
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“trademarks”) indicated that trade dress should be treated
79
The Court concluded that the
differently than word marks.
80
restaurant’s decor could be protected as “inherently” distinctive,
81
and awarded substantial monetary damages, despite the fact that
the jury found that the decor was not recognized by consumers as a
82
source identifier.
It was left to the concurring opinions to confirm what this case
was about—the affirmation of standards created by lower courts
83
over a half-century without the Supreme Court’s intervention.
Ultimately, the concurring justices also accepted the existing
framework and did not seriously question its application in this
case. This proved a mistake, as the Court found it necessary to
revisit this area in 2000—about which there will be additional
comment below.
84
The Court’s last trademark case before 2000, Qualitex, was
truly, to borrow from former President Bill Clinton, a “bridge to
85
Qualitex asked whether color alone
the twenty-first century.”
86
could be a trademark. Although the Court’s affirmative answer to
that question seemingly solidified the trend of expanding
trademark rights, Justice Breyer’s opinion was far more extended
and nuanced than the Court’s previous opinions in the postLanham Act era. Thus, although the Court recognized correctly
that color could be a trademark, it also recognized that “a product’s
79. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773-74.
80. See id. at 776 (affirming the decision of the court of appeals).
81. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir.
1991) (damage award of $1,868,600 (after doubling), plus attorney’s fees of
$937,550).
82. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 766.
83. Justice Stevens argued that the original text of § 43(a) “has been
transformed by the federal courts,” but agreed that the extension of protection to
trade dress was “consistent with the purposes of the statute and has recently been
endorsed by Congress.” Id. at 776 (Stevens, J., concurring). He argued that the
federal courts had expanded the interpretation of false designation of origin in
§ 43(a) to encompass trademark and trade dress infringement, id. at 779-80, but
that Congress acceded to this, particularly in its 1988 revision of the Lanham Act.
Id. at 783. Justice Thomas felt that § 43(a)’s language directly supported an
inclusion of trademark infringement, citing the “false description . . . including
words or other symbols tending falsely to describe” language of the statute. Id. at 785
(Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
84. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
85. William J. Clinton, Address at the Democratic National Convention (Aug.
29, 1996), available at http://www.4president.org/speeches/clintongore
1996convention.htm (last visited July 8, 2004).
86. 514 U.S. at 160-61.
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color is unlike ‘fanciful,’ ‘arbitrary,’ or ‘suggestive’ words or
designs, which almost automatically tell a customer they refer to a
87
brand.”
It analogized color to a descriptive mark, which can
88
require secondary meaning. Yet, even this showed that the Court
was thinking beyond the surface of the hierarchy to its underlying
function of determining whether a mark is a source identifier. The
Court also made reference to aesthetic functionality, a doctrine
often criticized by the bar, but which the Court believed had value
in cabining trademark, and preventing it from stepping into the
89
realm of patent law.
In sum, although the Court granted
protection, it did so in a way that recognized the problems, and
that reminded courts of their obligations both to assure themselves
that the proposed mark truly was a mark (limiting color marks to
those with secondary meaning) and that marks do not interfere
with competitive values. The former certainly was a departure from
Two Pesos, which applied the trademark distinctiveness hierarchy
90
without much discussion of its logic in the trade dress context.
At the close of the twentieth century, the Court’s trademark
jurisprudence in the second half of the century largely reflected
the Court’s absence from the scene. Lower courts had seized the
initiative in interpreting the Lanham Act, and the Supreme Court
intervened only very occasionally and only where there was a circuit
split, essentially acquiescing to the trends set by the lower courts
and Congress. Congress was notably active in the latter part of the
century, enacting a comprehensive reform of the Lanham Act in

87. Id. at 162-63 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 163.
89. See id. at 164-65 (stating “[i]t is the province of patent law, not trademark
law, to encourage invention . . .”). A design feature is “aesthetically functional” if
it is an ornamental design feature, and competitors deprived of the use of that
feature would be at a significant disadvantage in the marketplace. See id. at 170.
For example, if one company makes yellow computer cases and a competitor
could not make a yellow computer monitor, that might be a problem of aesthetic
functionality. See Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916
F.2d 76, 79-82 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 976 (1991) (ruling that
competitor could not be prevented from making Baroque-style silverware).
90. The Court also recognized the changes in the common law brought by
the Lanham Act that permitted color to be registered as a mark. Qualitex, 514 U.S.
at 171-73. Specifically, the Lanham Act’s definition of trademark was intended to
broaden the universe of registrable marks, and the Court accepted Congress’s
extension of the law without criticism. Id. at 171. Certainly, Qualitex cannot be
said to have relied on a pre-Lanham Act conception of the law to reach its
conclusion.
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1988, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in 1995, and the
93
Each of
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act in 1999.
these statutes represented an extension of trademark law in
94
response to issues raised in the lower courts. At the turn of the
century, no Supreme Court cases were in sight to interpret the last
two statutes. Only in Qualitex did the Court show any sign of
understanding that the expansion of trademark law might require
an approach more sensitive to competing interests, one that could
even suggest a need to slow this expansive trend.
II. TRADEMARK LAW IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
As noted earlier, I am choosing to begin the new millennium
with the year 2000 even though it is technically the end of the old
one. Not only was 2000 the “layperson’s” new beginning, but also
the Court’s trademark case in 2000—Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
95
Brothers, Inc. —represents a fairly clear break from the bulk of the
Court’s late twentieth century trademark jurisprudence. It also
marks a clear beginning of a jurisprudence that harkens back to
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and its discomfort
with the treatment of trademarks as a species of intellectual
96
property.
A. Wal-Mart
The Wal-Mart case was an apt place to begin the new
91. Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935
(1988).
92. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)
and 1127 (2000)).
93. Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1117(d), 1125(d), 1127, 1129 (2000)).
94. S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 7-8 (1988), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577,
5583-84 (noting that the 1988 amendments were intended to “provide consistent
national protection for the tremendous value of famous marks” by protecting
them from dilution); H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030 (explaining that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
creates a federal cause of action for trademark dilution and assists American
companies that compete with foreign companies); H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 5-6
(1999) (enacting legislation to combat “cyberpiracy,” which involves individuals
who attempt to profit by reserving domain names similar to trademarked names
with no intent to use them).
95. 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
96. The last of the four “new millennium” cases, the Dastar case, contains an
interesting and poignant contrast between trademark and copyright. See infra Part
II.D.
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millennium. It addresses one of the latest developments in
trademark law, namely, the use of the design of a product as a
97
trademark.
The Court visited this issue (or at least a closely
related one) before in Two Pesos, where the Court held that it is
possible for trade dress (product designs are considered a species
98
of trade dress) to be protected if it is “inherently distinctive.”
Lower courts assumed that Two Pesos applied equally to all forms of
trade dress, including product designs, but the results reached were
99
unsatisfactory.
Yet, in Wal-Mart, after a short preliminary
discussion, the Court made the bold statement that “[n]othing in
[the trademark statute], however, demands the conclusion that
every category of mark necessarily includes some marks ‘by which
100
the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods
of others’ without secondary meaning—that in every category some
101
marks are inherently distinctive.”
The Court reasoned that
although some devices such as word marks and packaging are
almost always intended to serve as source identifiers, other devices
such as product designs and colors do not automatically signify
102
source.
This is a materially different tone than Two Pesos, where
the Court emphasized that nothing in the statute indicated that
trade dress should be treated differently than word marks. Here,
the Court in effect states that nothing in the statute requires trade
dress and word marks to be treated the same.
Perhaps the most telling portion of the opinion came next, in
the following statement:
The fact that product design almost invariably serves
purposes other than source identification not only
97. In Wal-Mart, the plaintiff alleged that defendant had copied the design
motif of plaintiff’s line of children’s clothing. Underscoring the intellectual
property orientation of the case, plaintiff brought both copyright and trademark
infringement claims. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 208.
98. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., David S. Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent—The Dilemma of
Confusion, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 289, 309-20 (1999).
100. The Court was referring here to the registration applicants under § 2 of
the Lanham Act on the assumption, drawn from Two Pesos, that the standards of
section 2 applied equally to the protectability of unregistered marks under
§ 43(a). See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 210.
101. 529 U.S. at 211 (footnote added). The Court then cited Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1995) to demonstrate that one type of
trademark—color—can only be protected on a showing of secondary meaning.
Id.
102. Id. at 212-13. It is interesting that the Court made this assertion with no
citation to factual authority.
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renders inherent distinctiveness problematic; it also
renders application of an inherent-distinctiveness
principle more harmful to other consumer interests.
Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of
competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic
purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule of
law that facilitates plausible threats of suit against new
103
entrants based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness.
This, too, is a startling change in direction for the Court.
Rather than simply applying the statutory language and the judicial
gloss of many lower courts, the Court injected the view that the
interpretation of the statute (at least when it allows for
interpretation) must include a separate consideration of consumer
interests, assuming that such interests will be different than
trademark owner interests. Moreover, the Court recognized that
trademark law could be used as a competitive weapon, and that the
effectiveness of this weapon turned not on the ultimate result of
the suit, but on the ability of the plaintiff to sustain the suit past an
early stage. Thus, the Court rejected a multifactor test that would
104
not permit early disposition of lawsuits. Indeed, when discussing
the distinction—now very important—between packaging, which
can be inherently distinctive, and product design, which requires
secondary meaning, the Court directed lower courts to err in close
cases on the side of finding trade dress to be product design, not
105
packaging.
Clearly, the Court wanted these suits to be more
carefully scrutinized. Recognizing the anticompetitive nature of
such suits is an important step because copyrights and patents are
recognized as sanctioned monopolies, with the societal benefits
flowing from the inducement to produce works and inventions.
Obviously, the Court did not believe that a trademark monopoly
creates the same kind of societal benefit. As if to make clear that
trademark law is different from copyright and patent, the Court
noted that those doctrines would permit protection for many
product designs, and ameliorate the consequences of its decision.
In other words, the message to trademark owners is, if you want
intellectual property protection, use “real” intellectual property
103. Id. at 213.
104. Id. at 213-14 (citing the multifactor test formulated in Seabrook Foods,
Inc. v. Bar-well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
105. Id. at 215. The Court relegated its Two Pesos decision to its facts,
characterizing it as either a packaging case (a rather dubious conclusion) or some
tertium quid that is akin to packaging. Id.
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106

doctrines, not trademark law.
In a rather short opinion, the Court made a clean break from
its previous post-Lanham Act cases. Gone was the deference to
107
lower courts; gone was the acceptance of the judicial expansion
of trademark law. In their place was a message that trademark
protection had to compete with other concepts that also form the
basis of trademark law, such as consumer protection, and that
trademark law was not a substitute for conventional intellectual
property protection.
B. TrafFix
In the Court’s next term, it decided TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
108
Marketing Displays, Inc. TrafFix was really a follow-up to Wal-Mart.
The case similarly involved trademark protection for a product
109
design.
But the issue was whether the dual-spring design for a
temporary road sign was functional, and thus ineligible for
110
trademark protection.
The issue was complicated, or perhaps
simplified, by the fact that Marketing Displays (MDI), the plaintiff
and purported trademark owner, had expired patents on the
111
design.
The case required the Court to decide the effect of an
expired patent on the test for functionality.
Before turning to the particulars of the case, the Court began
with some general principles, notably the following:
Trade dress protection must subsist with the recognition
that in many instances there is no prohibition against
copying goods and products. In general, unless an
106. See id. at 214. It is also interesting that the Court specifically noted that
the doctrine of functionality includes aesthetic functionality. Id. The Court had
no obvious reason to include this statement, but the inclusion emphasizes the
Court’s determination that trademark law does not become an alternative to
patent and copyright. Id.
107. The Court rejected a test promulgated by a lower court. Id. at 213-14
(citing Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342 (C.C.P.A.
1977)).
108. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
109. Id. at 25.
110. Id. at 27-28. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(5), (f) (2000) (functional
designs not registrable); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(8) (2000) (functionality as a defense
to trademark incontestability); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2000) (in action for trade
dress infringement, burden of proof is on trademark owner to show nonfunctionality); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc, 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000)
(trade dress must not be functional); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S.
159, 164-65, 169-70 (1995) (discussing functionality).
111. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 25-26.
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intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright
protects an item, it will be subject to copying. As the
Court has explained, copying is not always discouraged or
disfavored by the laws which preserve our competitive
112
economy.
The same line between trademark and patent/copyright is
drawn in TrafFix, as in Wal-Mart. The Wal-Mart philosophy that
trademark is different than conventional intellectual property and
that trademark law should not hinder competition was furthered.
Indeed, the Court’s statement implied that trademark law is
intended to “preserve our competitive economy,” not to grant
113
proprietary rights to trademark owners.
When assessing functionality, the Court did not draw as
definitive of a line as it did in Wal-Mart; however, it did take a fairly
strong stand against trademark protection in this context. The
Court held that a utility patent is “strong evidence” of functionality,
and that it created a significant barrier to any contrary
114
conclusion.
Equally important, the Court explained its prior
statements about the test for functionality. In Qualitex, the Court
had stated that a feature was functional “if it is essential to the use
or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article, that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors
115
Several lower
at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.”
courts, including the one in TrafFix, interpreted the last phrase as
permitting trademark protection for a patented product design
116
unless the feature was “a competitive necessity.”
The Court
disagreed, however, stating that the latter analysis was only
117
necessary where the issue was aesthetic functionality.
If the
feature is important to the way the product works, it is not
necessary to investigate whether other means exist to accomplish
118
the same end. As a result, the Court made it harder for a plaintiff
to avoid a finding of functionality by demonstrating the existence
119
of alternative designs available for defendant’s use. Finally, at the
112. Id. at 29 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
113. See id.
114. Id. at 29-30. The Court’s discussion assumed that the feature to which
trademark protection was to attach was part of the claims of the patent. Id. at 31.
115. Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc.,
456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)) (emphasis added).
116. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 32-33.
117. Id. at 33. Aesthetic functionality is explained supra note 89.
118. Id. at 34.
119. The Federal Circuit, however, seems not to have taken the hint as
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end of the opinion (and not in a footnote), the Court sidestepped
a broader constitutional challenge to trade dress protection, but
noted “[i]f, despite the rule that functional features may not be the
subject of trade dress protection, a case arises in which trade dress
becomes the equivalent of an expired utility patent, that will be
time enough to consider [the effect of the Patent and Copyright
120
clause].”
This issue may have more relevance if trademark
dilution, the subject of the Court’s next trademark opinion, regains
its momentum as a form of trademark protection.
C. Moseley
The combination of Wal-Mart and TrafFix sent a significant
message to the trademark world. However, in terms of immediate
practical effect on the results of cases, and the momentum in this
121
area of law, the case of Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. may be the
most significant new millennium trademark case.
The case was the Court’s first foray into the realm of
trademark dilution, a form of trademark protection for
122
“distinctive” marks that protects such marks from the erosion of
their “unique” identities. Unlike traditional infringement claims,
dilution does not require any showing of likelihood of confusion.
Thus, dilution protection provides a potentially very powerful form
of protection, a virtual form of property in a trademark. Although
many states had laws providing dilution protection dating from the
123
1950s and 1960s, this form of trademark protection became
immensely popular following the passage of the Federal Trademark
124
Dilution Act (FTDA) in 1995.
Thus, like Wal-Mart and TrafFix,
seriously as it might have. See Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268,
1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that TrafFix did not preclude consideration of
alternative designs, and that TrafFix did not alter the law of functionality). Cf.
Antioch Co. v. W. Trimming Co., 347 F.3d 150, 156 (6th Cir. 2003) (declining to
decide whether TrafFix permits consideration of evidence of alternative designs).
120. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 35. Defendant had asserted that trade dress
protection for product designs created the equivalent of a perpetual patent, in
violation of the “limited times” provision of the Patent and Copyright Clause.
121. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
122. In the federal version, only “famous” marks are protected. See Lanham
Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
123. The earliest such law dates from 1947 in Massachusetts. See Moseley, 537
U.S. at 430.
124. Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1125(c) and 1127 (2000)). For a comprehensive treatment of trademark
dilution law, see generally DAVID S. WELKOWITZ, TRADEMARK DILUTION: FEDERAL,
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Moseley presented the Court with an issue of the extent of
trademark protection in a new and different form from that found
in traditional cases.
The facts of Moseley, particularly the involvement of the
lingerie giant Victoria’s Secret, attracted much attention. In
Elizabethtown, Kentucky, near an Army base, Victor and Cathy
Moseley opened a store called “Victor’s Secret” (later renamed
“Victor’s Little Secret”), which advertised various items, including
lingerie, “Lycra Dresses,” “Romantic Lighting,” and “Adult
125
Novelties/Gifts.”
The store came to the attention of Victoria’s
Secret via a letter from an Army colonel, who saw the advertisement
126
in his base newspaper.
Victoria’s Secret sued, claiming both
traditional infringement (i.e., likelihood of confusion) and
127
The district court
trademark dilution under the federal statute.
found no likelihood of confusion and dismissed the infringement
claim, but found in favor of Victoria’s Secret on the dilution
128
claim.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling on
129
the dilution claim.
On the surface, the issue before the Court was relatively
narrow. The FTDA permits a remedy when a second user “causes
130
dilution” of the first user’s famous trademark.
The question was
whether this language required a plaintiff to prove that there was
actual harm to the mark from dilution in order to prevail, or
whether it was sufficient to demonstrate that there was a
131
“likelihood of dilution.” On this question, the circuits had split.
Moseley is not an example of judicial craftsmanship. The
opinion jumps from place to place and its result is far more
132
muddled than one would like.
Nevertheless, the opinion
STATE, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (BNA Books 2002 & Supp. 2003).
125. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 423.
126. Id.
127. Kentucky has no dilution statute.
128. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 425.
129. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d,
537 U.S. 418 (2003). The infringement ruling was not appealed. Id. at 467.
130. Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000).
131. Compare Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460-61, 464-65 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528
U.S. 923 (1999) (holding actual dilution necessary) with Nabisco, Inc. v. PF
Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 223 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding likelihood of dilution
sufficient) and Moseley, 259 F.3d at 475-76.
132. Moreover, Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion, seemingly repudiating
the opinion he purports to join, is another oddity in the Court’s handling of the
case and emphasizes the lack of clarity in the opinion. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at 435
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contains many echoes of Wal-Mart and TrafFix.
The Court began its substantive discussions with a relatively
bland statement: “Traditional trademark infringement law is a part
133
of the broader law of unfair competition.” Then, the Court cited
Qualitex for the proposition that trademark law protects consumers
134
from deception and producers from unfair competition.
These
statements are nevertheless consistent with the line separating
trademarks from patents and copyrights that was evident in TrafFix
and Wal-Mart. But this introduction is followed by more pointed
statements. First, when discussing the development of trademark
dilution, the Court noted (almost gratuitously): “Unlike traditional
infringement law, the prohibitions against trademark dilution are
not the product of common-law development, and are not motivated
135
by an interest in protecting consumers.” The message is clear that this
form of trademark protection is to be viewed with care, even
skepticism, because it is not like ordinary trademark law. Ordinary
trademark law is grounded in unfair competition and consumer
protection, not intellectual property.
The next section of the opinion discusses the legislative history
of the FTDA, although the purpose of this discussion is not clear
136
because the Court did not follow Congress’s apparent intent.
However, evidence of the Court’s skepticism about dilution can be
inferred. The Court makes a point of stating how quick and
perfunctory Congress’s consideration of the bill was in 1995,
emphasizing the “[one]-day hearing” held by the House
committee, the lack of any opposition at that hearing, and the fact
that the Senate passed the House version the day it was introduced
137
“by voice vote without any hearings.”
Since the content of the
House committee report and the Senate floor statements quoted in
this section went virtually ignored in the rest of the opinion, the
emphasis on the process of passage is striking.
The best
explanation is that the haste with which Congress appeared to be
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 428.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
136. Justice Scalia declined to join this section of the opinion, which is entirely
devoted to a legislative history discussion. At the end of this section, the Court
quotes a portion of the House Report to the effect that dilution includes both
blurring and tarnishment. Id. at 431. Yet, in the next section, where the Court
states that tarnishment may not be encompassed by the FTDA, this legislative
history is nowhere to be found. Id. at 432.
137. Id. at 431.
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acting gave credence to the Court’s skepticism about the propriety
of expanding federal trademark law into this area.
Arguably, one could characterize the Court’s ultimate holding
as coming to a middle ground between the “presumption of harmlikelihood of dilution” standard of the Sixth Circuit below and the
“actual economic harm” standard derived from the Fourth
138
Circuit. However, the “actual dilution” standard, which the Court
139
not unreasonably derived from the language of the statute, makes
it extremely difficult to prove a dilution case, particularly when
combined with two other aspects of the Court’s opinion. First,
although the Court disclaimed any requirement of actual economic
harm, it was extremely vague about what evidence would suffice to
show actual dilution. All it would say is that a plaintiff could
140
dispense with a survey “if actual dilution can reliably be proved
through circumstantial evidence—the obvious case is one where
141
the junior and senior marks are identical.”
The meaning of this
142
Second, the Court’s view of
statement has mystified courts.
dilution itself also makes winning a case difficult. In the Court’s
view, it is not enough that the junior use “call to mind” the senior
use for dilution to be found. The junior use must also change
143
consumer perceptions about the senior mark.
As the Court
stated: “ ‘Blurring’ is not a necessary consequence of mental
144
While a survey might show a mental association
association.”
between the marks, it will be difficult to show the kind of altered
perception of the famous mark required by the Court.
138. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of
Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460-61, 464-65 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 923
(1999). The Fourth Circuit waffled on the exact standard. Some language in the
opinion certainly supports the actual economic harm requirement, but other
language supports a standard similar to the one that was ultimately adopted by the
Supreme Court. The “presumption” language in the Moseley opinion refers to the
fact that in some circuits the court could presume harm from indirect evidence
that dilution was likely to occur. As the Court noted, the Second Circuit had set
forth a number of factors to use in determining likelihood of dilution, and this
standard had been followed by the Sixth Circuit in Moseley. See Moseley, 537 U.S. at
426 n.6, 427 n.8.
139. The Court cited the “causes dilution” language of § 43(c)(1), contrasting
it with the explicit “likelihood of dilution” standard found in the earlier state
statutes such as the one in Massachusetts. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432-33.
140. In practice, such a survey could be expensive and difficult to accomplish
properly.
141. Id. at 434.
142. See Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 535 (7th Cir. 2003).
143. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433-34 (explaining the “blurring” concept).
144. Id. at 434.
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Moseley relied more on the precise statutory language than did
Wal-Mart or TrafFix, largely because the statutory language in those
cases did not answer the question posed. But Moseley’s direction
certainly was consonant with the other cases. The Court again
emphasized the consumer protection and unfair competition roots
of trademark law and took a narrow view of trademark protection,
the scope of which is more akin to a property right than to
consumer protection. The effect of the Moseley decision on the
courts was a dramatic slowdown in dilution opinions, as compared
145
with the pre-Moseley period.
D. Dastar
The last of the Court’s new millennium cases is, in truth, not
really a trademark case. Nevertheless, it is included here because
the claim central to the Court’s opinion arises under the Lanham
146
Act, and the tenor and philosophy of the Court’s opinion is
entirely consistent with the three cases discussed above.
147
In Dastar v. Twentieth Century Fox, Dastar bought copies of a
videotaped television series that was (at least arguably) in the
public domain. The original series, owned by Fox, was based on a
book by Dwight Eisenhower. Dastar edited the tapes, made some
minor alterations, and sold its own tapes under a new name, with
148
no reference to Fox or General Eisenhower’s book.
Fox sued,
claiming copyright infringement, and also “reverse passing off,” the
149
latter under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. As in Moseley, the precise
language of the statute proved important. Relevant to Dastar,
145. See infra text at notes 182-86. The Court also questioned whether one
common category of dilution—trademark tarnishment—was even protected by the
federal law. Tarnishment refers to the association of a mark with unsavory
characteristics, such as pornography, drug use, or poor quality goods. See CocaCola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (involving an
“Enjoy Cocaine” poster in script and colors resembling Coca-Cola packaging). In
a statement in Moseley, the Court expressed doubt that the definition of dilution
contained in the federal statute (and now contained in a majority of state dilution
statutes) encompassed tarnishment. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 432.
146. To be precise, Lanham Act § 43(a), codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(2000). This is the same section that was at issue in Wal-Mart and TrafFix, albeit a
different use of that section.
147. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003).
148. Id. at 2044.
149. The reverse passing off claim asserted that Dastar’s failure to give
attribution to Fox in effect “passed off” Fox’s product as that of Dastar (the reverse
of the usual passing off claim, in which Dastar would try to pass off Dastar’s
product as that of Fox’s).
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§ 43(a) permitted a claim for making a “false designation of origin”
150
The key legal question was whether “origin” of
of the “goods.”
“goods” means only the source of the product itself, or whether it
includes the source of the work embodied in the goods.
Initially, the Court responded to Fox’s claim by stating that the
phrase “origin of goods” means just that—the source of the
151
physical product, not the ideas that it may embody.
In other
words, although Fox may have been the source of the underlying
152
ideas and/or content, the actual tape was made by, and therefore
originated, with Dastar.
The Court then considered Fox’s
argument that those products whose selling point is really the
creative or “communicative” aspect, not the physical product,
153
should be treated differently.
It is here that the Court’s
discussion took an interesting turn.
“The problem with this argument,” wrote the Court, “is that it
causes the Lanham Act to conflict with the law of copyright, which
154
addresses that subject specifically.”
The Court went on to quote
the Sears-Campo case about the right of the public to make the
goods once a patent expires (citing also the Kellogg case), the
TrafFix opinion about the right of the public to copy items
unprotected by “an intellectual property right,” and the Bonito Boats
case, concerning the reciprocal rights conferred on and extracted
155
from copyright and patent owners. It then quoted the passage in
TrafFix about being “ ‘careful to caution against misuse or overextension’ of trademark and related protections into areas
156
traditionally occupied by patent or copyright.”
The Court
returned to the Trade-Mark Cases to note that “[f]ederal trademark
157
law ‘has no necessary relation to invention or discovery,’ ”
150. Id. at 2047.
151. Id. The Court noted that a Coke drinker would be concerned that the
actual drink came from Coca-Cola, not that Coca-Cola be the source of the formula
from which it is made. Id.
152. In fact, Fox was apparently responsible for neither, though it had once
owned a copyright in the original tapes. See id. at 2044 (stating that the series was
produced by Time, Inc., with the copyright assigned to Fox, but the copyright not
renewed in 1977).
153. Id. at 2048.
154. Id.
155. Id. (citing TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29
(2001); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51
(1989); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1964); Kellogg Co.
v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 121-22 (1938)).
156. Id.
157. Id. (quoting In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879)).
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cementing the separation of trademark from intellectual property.
Later in the Dastar opinion, the Court creates a bond with WalMart and TrafFix by stating that a contrary result would be
inconsistent with the results of those cases, which also resisted uses
of trademark law that prevent copying of public domain
158
materials.
Summing up, the Court again asserted that the
Lanham Act’s foundations “were not designed to protect originality
159
In what must be termed a rather ironic use of a
or creativity.”
recent case, it concluded: “To hold otherwise would be akin to
finding that [section] 43(a) created a species of perpetual patent
and Copyright, which Congress may not do. See Eldred v. Ashcroft,
160
537 U.S. 186, 208 . . . (2003).”
The citation of Eldred is
interesting because in Eldred, just months earlier, the Court
resoundingly (though not unanimously) upheld Congress’s power
to extend the term of existing copyrights against arguments that
161
this effectively created a perpetual copyright.
Citing Eldred for
the limiting proposition in Dastar demonstrates just how far
removed the Court wants trademark law to be from traditional
intellectual property.
III. THE LESSONS OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM
What can be learned from the Supreme Court’s cases thus far
in the millennium? First, as discussed below, it appears that WalMart was the beginning of a paradigm shift in trademark law.
Second, some of the lower courts have not fully implemented this
new paradigm, perhaps in part because they do not recognize it,
perhaps in part out of habit, or perhaps in part because they are
accustomed to developing trademark law on their own, with the
Supreme Court operating largely in the background. Third, the
new paradigm could lead to a reexamination of recent extensions
of trademark law that tend to treat trademark less like unfair
competition and more like property.
A. The Paradigm Shift
Beginning with Wal-Mart, the Court increasingly has viewed
trademark law through the lens of unfair competition, rather than
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 2049.
Id. at 2050.
Id.
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208, 222 (2003).
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intellectual property. In Wal-Mart, the fear of unwarranted
monopolization of product designs was evident in the Court’s
discussion of the need for a clear rule to discourage lawsuits that
162
would hinder competition.
The TrafFix statements about
functionality reinforce the viewpoint of unfair competition versus
163
intellectual property.
The observation in Moseley that trademark
dilution protection benefits trademark owners, not consumers,
follows the same path. Finally, Dastar’s specific juxtaposition of
trademark on the one hand and intellectual property rights (i.e.,
copyright and patent) on the other, together with its reiteration of
the TrafFix caution about overprotecting trademarks, solidifies the
theme. As a result, whether certain uses of trademark law will be
permitted seems to turn on whether there is some pro-consumer,
or at least pro-competitive (or anti-unfair competition) aspect to
the particular trademark principle in question. In other words, the
Court tests trademark not with an eye toward protecting trademark
owners for their own sake, but protecting consumers and the
competitive economy from harm.
To some degree, the consistency of the message may reflect
the stability of the Court’s membership. No new justices have been
164
appointed since the time before the Qualitex opinion in 1995,
and that stability has allowed the Court to speak with a unanimous
voice on the subject.
On the other hand, rather than being a completely new
vantage point, the new paradigm may be an example of “what goes
around, comes around.” By regarding trademark as a species of
unfair competition, rather than intellectual property, the Court
returned to its pre-Lanham Act view of trademark law. In the
Trade-Mark Cases, the Court specifically rejected an attempt to
ground trademark in Congress’s power over other forms of
165
intellectual property. In Singer and Kellogg, the Court emphasized
166
the needs of competition when ruling that marks were generic.
The Court also emphasized that once a patent expires, trademark
law cannot be counted on to retain the patent monopoly. The
162. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2003).
163. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (dealing
with patent law).
164. Justice White, who wrote the Two Pesos opinion, retired in 1993, and was
succeeded by Justice Ginsburg. The last Justice to retire was Justice Blackmun, in
1994, succeeded by Justice Breyer.
165. In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1879).
166. See supra notes 18, 31 and accompanying text.
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same pro-competitive theme was echoed in Champion Spark Plug,
permitting used spark plugs imprinted with the original brand
167
name to compete with new ones of the same brand.
In Hanover
Star Milling and Rectanus the requirement that the trademark
follows the trade underscores the unfair competition aspect of
trademark over property rights—good-faith junior users cannot be
“unfairly” deprived of their right to retain their trade, even in the
face of a senior user from another region.
The primary message seems to be that the post-Lanham Act
expansion of trademark law into something akin to traditional
intellectual property law deeply concerns the Court. Admittedly,
the justices may have different reasons for their concerns. Justice
Breyer has demonstrated a broad concern about the expansion of
168
intellectual property rights.
To a lesser degree, Justice Stevens
169
has indicated his concerns as well. Several of the Justices may be
concerned that Congress is beginning to reach the boundaries of
its enumerated powers. Although the Commerce Clause gives
Congress broad power to regulate, the existence of a specific power
to regulate intellectual property, a power that allows rights only for
170
“limited times” and that impliedly contains other limitations, may
be viewed as an implicit limit on Congress’s power to expand the
scope of trademark rights, especially where those rights would rival
the limited intellectual property rights provided in the Patent and
171
Copyright Clause.
Emphasizing unfair competition over intellectual property may
help explain how the same Court that decided Moseley and Dastar
could so forcefully uphold Congress’s authority in Eldred v.

167. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
168. See generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242-69 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1970).
169. Three of his opinions in intellectual property cases provide useful
examples: Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003) (Justice Stevens
wrote the opinion for the Court); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 222-42 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 206-20 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346
(1991) (stating “[o]riginality is a constitutional requirement” of copyright).
171. Justice Thomas has indicated his discomfort even with the current
interpretation of Congress’s commerce power, apparently preferring the more
limited interpretation of the late nineteenth century, when the Trade-Mark Cases
were decided. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 601 n.8 (1995) (Thomas,
J., concurring).
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172

Ashcroft.
Although Eldred clearly expanded the scope of
Congress’s copyright authority, that authority was exercised
pursuant to a specific grant of intellectual property power.
Moreover, the Court was able to cite rather old precedent that was
at least analogous to the term extension problems at issue in
173
Eldred.
B. Some Implications of the New Trademark Paradigm
Certain implications of these cases seem obvious. Where
trademark law comes into conflict with patent or copyright, or
begins to look like a substitute for patent or copyright, expect the
Court to be wary.
One area where this may arise is
pharmaceuticals, where drug companies have used trade dress law
(the color and/or shape of pills, for example) in an attempt to
174
Another
extend their exclusive rights to sell certain products.
obvious problem is trademark dilution protection for product
175
176
designs. Such protection, if permitted, would bring trademark
177
Perhaps
law very close to the realm of design patent.
functionality will prove an obstacle. The Court’s continued
mention of the aesthetic functionality may be a warning to lower
courts to ensure that the issue does become an obstacle, but if not,
one would expect the Court to step in and preclude such
expansion.
In an indirect way, these cases could have some effect in areas
seemingly far afield from trademark law—for example, the Digital
178
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and the proposed database
179
Portions of the DMCA are not really regulations
protection law.
172. 537 U.S. 186, 201-04 (2003).
173. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 201-04.
174. See generally Shire US Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 329 F.3d 348 (3d Cir. 2003)
(finding shape and color of an unpatented drug functional).
175. See I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 48-51 (1st Cir. 1998)
(questioning dilution claim concerning design of faucet); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 171,
173 (2000) (stating that a design that meets the statutory patentability standards
can receive patent protection for fourteen years).
176. See TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 95-98
(2d Cir. 2001) (marks must be inherently distinctive to be eligible for federal
dilution protection).
177. See I.P. Lund, 163 F.3d at 51-53 (Boudin, J., concurring); see also TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001).
178. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of Title 17 of the United States Code).
179. See Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354, 106th Cong.
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of copyright. Of course, the Court could find these provisions to
be “necessary and proper” adjuncts to the powers under the
Copyright Clause.
Eldred’s deferential treatment could be
supportive here. But one also should recall Dastar’s pointed
comment about perpetual copyrights, and its citation to Eldred.
The database protection law would rely on the commerce power as
well. Moreover, the Court may be troubled by the use of the
commerce power to circumvent Feist’s constitutionally based
181
preclusion of copyrighting facts. Indeed, the Court could choose
to view the issue as one of unfair competition. Depending on the
Court’s view of the value of the law as a protection for consumers,
the Court may give less deference to Congress’s power than it did
in Eldred.
What can we learn from the recent cases about the Court’s
attitude toward logical extensions of trademark, some of which are
already occurring? Digital media, the Internet, and globalization
have been at the forefront of technology and intellectual property
since the last few years of the twentieth century. In 1999, Congress
182
added the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)
to the Lanham Act, as § 43(d), just after the dilution section,
§ 43(c). The ACPA seeks to protect trademark owners from others
who, in bad faith, register domain names containing trademarks
(or terms confusingly similar to trademarks). Much of the ACPA’s
focus is on domain names that are identical to or “confusingly
similar” to another’s trademark and that are registered in bad faith
(often to sell the domain name at a premium to the trademark
owner). Therefore, the four new millennium cases might not seem
183
to raise problems for this extension of trademark law.
But there
are various aspects of the ACPA that raise interesting issues. First,
(1999); Collections of Information Act, H.R. 2652, 105th Cong. (1998); Database
Investment and Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R. 3531, 104th
Cong. (1996).
180. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 813 (6th ed. 2003) (“Chapter 12 [the
DMCA] is not copyright legislation—strictly, or even not so strictly, speaking.
Rather, it is what has been termed ‘paracopyright’ legislation: a new and
independent set of regulations on activities related to the use of copyrighted
works, in addition to those of copyright law itself.”).
181. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350-51 (1991).
182. Pub. L. No. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A-545
(1999) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 125(d) (2000)).
183. The domain name registrants usually are not using the mark as their
trademark. Often they are using it to capitalize on Internet search engines to
direct possibly unknowing Internet users to their sites.
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in addition to allowing a remedy against domain names that are
confusingly similar to a trademark, the ACPA allows suits where the
offending domain name is merely “dilutive” of another’s (famous)
184
trademark.
Thus, it incorporates the concerns the Court
expressed about dilution favoring trademark owners, not
consumers, despite the “consumer protection” label on the statute.
Moseley and its penumbra may affect any ACPA claims alleging
dilution. Second, “noncommercial use or fair use” is a factor in
assessing bad faith, but not a defense, which represents a change
185
from the law in other situations. One would expect the Court to
186
keep a wary eye on this statute for possible anticompetitive uses.
The ACPA contains another innovation—albeit one that
reaches back to the nineteenth century—in that it permits an in rem
action against the domain name, where the true owner of the
offending domain name cannot be found or is not subject to in
187
personam jurisdiction.
This provision will test the Court’s
willingness to review personal jurisdiction in an international
context. The last such case resulted in a ruling against jurisdiction
188
over the foreign entity, although that was an in personam action.
The in rem provisions of the ACPA also would require the Court to
189
revisit Shaffer v. Heitner in a new context.
The Internet also has spearheaded an extension of traditional
likelihood-of-confusion analysis to encompass something called
190
“initial interest confusion.”
The basis for this claim is that
184. Lanham Act § 43(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(II)
(2000).
185. See Lanham Act § 33(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000) (fair use
defense); Lanham Act § 43(c)(4)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(4)(B) (2000)
(excluding noncommercial uses from causes of action for dilution).
186. Section 43(d)(1)(B)(ii) gives a defense to bad faith if the person
reasonably believed the use was fair or lawful. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii)
(2000). Depending on how this provision is interpreted, it may ameliorate the
effect of making noncommercial uses only a factor. The KP Permanent case,
discussed infra Part III.D, which deals with the fair use defense under § 33(b)(4),
may shed some indirect light on this issue.
187. Lanham Act § 43(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2) (2000).
188. Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987)
(holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction by California court over
Japanese manufacturer would be unreasonable and unfair).
189. 433 U.S. 186, 216-17 (1977) (holding that Delaware’s assertion of in rem
jurisdiction over defendants violated the due process clause of the United States
Constitution). The last case to raise an issue pertaining to a “traditional” form of
personal jurisdiction, Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990),
resulted in unanimous agreement on the result, but no majority rationale.
190. See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174
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191

consumers are initially drawn to the defendant’s web site by the
use of, for example, a domain name containing another’s
trademark, or a search engine that lists a particular site as a result
of the use of metatags in the web page code or just the use of the
192
trademark somewhere on the web page. It is often characterized
as protection against a “bait and switch,” where consumers are
misled into purchasing from someone other than the trademark
193
owner by mistake. However, if the consumer is only momentarily
misled, as when he or she goes to the wrong Internet web site, and
can recover in one or two mouse clicks when the error becomes
apparent, the consumer protective function of this doctrine
becomes rather thin. Instead, it looks more like protection for the
trademark owner against a competitor that has sold goods or
services to a consumer who is fully aware at the time of purchase
from whom he or she is purchasing.
A recent appellate case extended this pliable doctrine even
further. Netscape Communications uses its search engine as a
194
vehicle to sell banner advertisements on the Internet. One of its
ventures involves selling “keyed” advertisements, which are
195
Netscape keyed
triggered by search terms entered by a user.
advertisements relating to “sex and adult oriented entertainment”
to the words “playboy” and “playmate,” leading to a lawsuit by
196
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. (PEI). PEI’s main theory was that users
would think that they were clicking on an ad for a Playboy site, and
would realize their mistake only when they arrived at the website.
PEI described this as a means to “gain[] a customer by
appropriating the goodwill that [PEI] has developed in its []
197
mark.”
The district court granted summary judgment to
F.3d 1036, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1999).
191. Initial interest confusion is not limited to actions involving consumer
issues, but claims of initial interest confusion by consumers are the most common.
192. See Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020,
1025 (9th Cir. 2004). The concept works also in the “brick and mortar” world if
someone is initially induced to inquire of defendant based on the similarity
between defendant’s name and that of plaintiff. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus
Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987).
193. See AM Gen. Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 311 F.3d 796, 828 (7th Cir.
2002).
194. Banner ads stretch along the top or side of a web page. Playboy, 354 F.3d
at 1023.
195. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1023.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1025. See Promatek Indus. v. Equitrac Corp., 300 F.3d 808, 812-13
(7th Cir. 2002) (“What is important is not the duration of the confusion, it is the
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Netscape, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding
198
issues of fact to be tried.
Initial interest confusion poses a challenge in light of the
Court’s new millennium posture. In many ways, this form of
trademark infringement gives property-like value to the “goodwill”
of the mark, and only incidentally protects consumers from harm.
Moreover, it may be another form of a litigation “weapon” that a
trademark owner can use to forestall entry by a competitor. The
Court could possibly label a defendant’s actions a form of “unfair”
competition, justifying the doctrine on that basis. However, should
such a case reach the Court, the Court will have to reconcile its
consumer oriented, pro-competition view of trademark with a
doctrine seeking to protect trademark owner goodwill (which is
199
also the province of trademark dilution, the issue in Moseley).
The concurring opinion in Playboy v. Netscape pointed out the
broad and problematic potential of the initial interest confusion
200
doctrine.
The last has certainly not been heard of this. One
would expect an eventual trip to the Supreme Court, though it
probably will require a serious split in the circuits before the Court
takes up this issue.
Finally, the Internet may test the outer limits of Congress’s
power to regulate trademark related problems occurring, at least in
part, outside the borders of the United States. This, too, will pose
interesting challenges for the Court. In addition to the personal
jurisdiction problems referred to earlier, there are international
comity issues to consider. Just what is the limit of the United States
regulatory authority in the international marketplace? The Fourth
Circuit recently took an expansive view of Congress’s power to
201
reach uses that only affect marks used overseas.
The Supreme
misappropriation of Promatek’s goodwill”). PEI also alleged trademark dilution.
Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1031-34.
198. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1034.
199. The statement in Kellogg that a competitor may share in the market
originator’s goodwill may not apply here because the competitor arguably is
seeking to share in the goodwill of the trademark, not just the product. However,
Kellogg was decided at a time when the power of trademarks was only beginning to
be realized. It may be that a strong trademark is a barrier to entry necessitating
some use of the mark to compete. Cf. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir.
1968) (finding no infringement in the use of competitor’s mark in truthful
comparative advertisement).
200. Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1034-36 (Berzon, J., concurring).
201. Int’l Bancorp L.L.C. v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des
Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1052
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Court denied certiorari in the case; no split in the circuits exists.
But the issue will probably resurface. Previous cases offer few clues
to the Court’s thinking on this matter. None of the federalism
issues that have dominated the commerce power debates of late
exists in this context. Thus, the Court may be more inclined to
defer to Congress, especially if it believes that United States
202
consumers will be confused.
These issues involving the new millennium technology of the
Internet, the concerns of globalism, and the expansion of
trademark laws to reach those issues represent some of the tests of
203
If
the Court’s recent jaundiced view of trademark-as-property.
the Court remains on the course set thus far in the new
millennium, then we may see a United States trademark regime
that distances itself from international trends.
C. The Effect on Lower Court Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court decides a tiny number of cases each
204
year—fewer than 100 are given full hearings.
Thus, the Court
must depend on district courts and the courts of appeals to
implement its vision.
It is somewhat early to assess the effects of such recent cases,
but a few preliminary judgments can be made. The Moseley and
Dastar cases appear to have had an impact—Moseley’s being very
significant. Part of the reason for Moseley’s impact may be its lack of
205
guidance.
Nevertheless, the decision has slowed the pace of
dilution cases significantly and made winning such cases a very
206
difficult proposition. No appellate court has upheld a finding of
(2004). The Casino de Monte Carlo challenged the registration of various domain
names by a non-United States national that included the casino’s trademark.
However, the casino’s only activity in the United States is promotional—it operates
no business here, although United States citizens visit the casino in Monte Carlo to
gamble. The Fourth Circuit held that the United States advertising, plus the use
of the casino in Monte Carlo by United States citizens, invoked the foreign
commerce power of Congress and fell within the “use in commerce” requirement
of the Lanham Act. Id. at 363-70.
202. But cf. Asahi Metal Ind. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 115-16
(1987) (expressing concern about U.S. courts adjudicating claims with little
connection to this country).
203. In this regard, the Court’s view seems contrary to the international trend.
204. The Justices’ Caseload, available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
about/justicecaseload.pdf (last visited July 8, 2004).
205. See Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s, Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 535-36 (7th Cir. 2003).
206. In the few successful cases, district courts have found the marks to be
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207

dilution since Moseley.
The Ninth Circuit has remanded three
dilution cases with instructions to reconsider in light of Moseley, but
208
without any guidance as to the proper framework for the inquiry.
Courts appear to have been following Dastar, resulting in some
dismissals. Potentially, Dastar could fundamentally change the
framework of false designation of origin claims under § 43(a), but
209
it is too early to tell.
Of the two earlier cases, Wal-Mart is easier to implement. Its
requirements are straightforward, and its admonishment about
close cases (presuming it is a design, not packaging) simplifies the
210
decision-making process. TrafFix was less clear; as a result, not all
identical. Nike, Inc. v. Variety Wholesalers, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1372 (S.D.
Ga. 2003); Pinehurst, Inc. v. Wick, 256 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2003);
Scott Fetzer Co. v. Gehring, 288 F. Supp. 2d 696, 702 (E.D. Pa. 2003); see Four
Seasons Hotels & Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 133132 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (actual harm found in case where marks were identical). Cf.
Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, No. 02 Civ. 9377 SAS, 2003 WL 22451731 at *13-15, 68
U.S.P.Q.2d 1893 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2003) (even where marks are identical, further
evidence of actual dilution may be required); Lee Middleton Original Dolls, Inc. v.
Seymour Mann, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 892, 902 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (in apparent
identical mark case, court decides to send issue of dilution to jury “[i]n view of the
developing status of the law on the nature of evidence required”); see also Softbelly’s,
353 F.3d at 535-36 (noting, but not deciding, the issue of required evidence in a
non-identical marks case). One oddity is that lower courts have not taken up and
expressly ruled on Moseley’s strong hint that tarnishment may not be covered by
the FTDA.
207. See Softbelly’s, 353 F.3d at 535-36; Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337
F.3d 616, 625-28 (6th Cir. 2003); Enter. Rent-A-Car Co. v. Advantage Rent-A-Car,
Inc., 330 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
208. Horphag Research, Ltd. v. Pellegrini, 337 F.3d 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied sub nom., Garcia v. Horphag Research Ltd.,124 S. Ct. 1090 (2004);
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1033 &
n.56 (9th Cir. 2004); Visa Int’l Serv. Assn. v. JSL Corp., No. 02-17353, 03-15420,
2003 WL 23018942 at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 22, 2003).
209. See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 23-25 (2d Cir. 1976)
(enjoining rebroadcast of Monty Python edited episodes that “mutilated” the
originals). The use of § 43(a) made in Gilliam could be undermined by Dastar. As
the concurring judge in the case noted, the “false designation” claim could be
handled by an appropriate disclaimer. Id. at 27 (Gurfein, J., concurring); but see
id. at 25 n.13 (majority rejects disclaimer as inadequate). The Gilliam case, like
Dastar, included a copyright claim. The demise of false attribution claims under
§ 43(a) also could call into question whether the United States is adhering to its
obligations under the Berne Convention, governing copyrights.
Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 6bis(1) (July 24,
1971), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (Paris Revision) [hereinafter Berne Convention], available
at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/index.html (last visited July 8,
2004).
210. See, e.g., Adidas-Salomon AG v. Target Corp., No. CV-01-1582-ST, 2002 WL
31971831 at *10-11 (D. Or. July 31, 2002) (following Wal-Mart, choosing to view

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss5/6

38

Welkowitz: The Supreme Court and Trademark law in the New Millennium
WELKOWITZ-FORMATTED

2004]

7/20/2004 6:49:44 PM

TRADEMARK LAW IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

1697

courts have been eager to accept it as establishing a new
211
functionality framework, though some movement is apparent.
D. Speculation about the KP Permanent Case
As of this writing, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in
another trademark case, KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting
212
KP Permanent differs from the previous “new
Impression I, Inc.
millennium” Supreme Court cases in that it does not involve an
expansive use of trademark law in a new form, such as a product
213
design, dilution, or a right of attribution.
Instead, it is a rather
214
ordinary dispute not unlike the Park ’N Fly case.
Lasting
Impression has an incontestable trademark in a logo containing
215
the words “MICRO COLORS,” used on permanent make-up. KP
Permanent made a competing product and used the term
“microcolor” on advertising circulars and on the labels of its
216
pigment bottles.
When Lasting Impression demanded cessation
of KP Permanent’s use of “microcolor,” KP Permanent sought a
217
declaratory judgment of non-infringement. Among its claims was
that it had a “fair use” defense to any infringement under section
33(b)(4), asserting that its use of “microcolor” was fair, not as a
218
trademark, but instead as a description of its product.
The
the case as one about product design).
211. Compare Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (concluding that TrafFix did not preclude consideration of alternative
designs nor alter the law of functionality) with Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v.
Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 355-56 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying TrafFix). See also Eco
Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 854, 866 n.5 (S.D. Ind. 2003)
(noting different cases applying TrafFix), aff’d, 357 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2003)
(affirming on grounds of no abuse of discretion, but declining to specifically
uphold the district court’s reasoning). Cf. Antioch Co. v. W. Trimming Co., 347
F.3d 150, 156 (6th Cir. 2003) (declining to decide whether TrafFix permits
consideration of evidence of alternative designs).
212. 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 981 (2004).
213. See id.
214. See supra Part I.C.
215. KP Permanent, 328 F.3d at 1065. Permanent make-up is injected into the
skin and can be used both for cosmetic purposes and for medical ones (such as
covering scarring). Id.
216. The process of permanent make-up is also known as micropigmentation.
Id.
217. Id. at 1065-66.
218. Fair use doctrine is one of the listed defenses to an incontestable
trademark. The relevant portion of the statute reads as follows:
Such conclusive evidence [of the right to use the registered mark on
the part of the owner of an incontestable mark] shall be subject to
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district court upheld this defense and granted summary
219
220
The Ninth Circuit
judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.
held that KP Permanent must show an absence of confusion to
221
invoke the fair use defense.
The circuits have split on whether
demonstrating an absence of confusion is a requirement for
222
invoking the defense, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari
223
in an apparent effort to resolve the split.
Although this case does not involve a new extension of
trademark protection, the themes of the four recent cases may
provide clues to the Court’s disposition of this case. We can begin
with the interesting and obvious observation that in the new
millennium the Supreme Court has reversed the Court of Appeals
each time. Perhaps the Court is trying to be a corrective overseer,
intervening only when it sees a problem. One assumes that
eventually this string of appellate losses will be broken; certainly the
224
Court takes some cases to affirm them.
A more analytical clue
can be garnered by considering the two cases from the Court’s
most recent term, Moseley and Dastar. In both cases, the Court gave

proof of infringement as defined in section 1114 of this title [Lanham
Act § 32], and shall be subject to the following defenses or defects:
...
(4) That the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an
infringement is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party’s
individual name in his own business, or of the individual name of
anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is
descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the
goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin; . . .
Lanham Act § 33(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b) (2000).
219. 328 F.3d at 1066.
220. Id. at 1073.
221. Id. at 1072.
222. Compare Cosmetically Sealed Indus., Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s USA Co.,
125 F.3d 28, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1997) (confusion does not eliminate defense);
Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 1997)
(seemingly rejecting confusion as means of eliminating fair use defense), with KP
Permanent, 328 F.2d at 1072 (fair use defense requires absence of confusion).
223. There were other issues brought to the Ninth Circuit, but the fair use
issue was the only one for which KP Permanent sought review. KP Permanent
Make-up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression Inc., 328 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2003), petition for
cert. filed, No. 03-409, 2003 WL 22429005 at *i (U.S. Aug. 18, 2003). There is one
aspect of KP Permanent that is somewhat unusual. KP Permanent’s use of
“microcolors,” while arguably not a trademark use, seems designed to make the
term microcolor into a generic description of the product. That is different than a
purely descriptive use of terms that, outside of the trademark context, can be used
descriptively.
224. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), is one such example.
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a strict interpretation of the applicable statutory language. If the
Court follows this pattern, then a reversal is a distinct possibility.
The relevant statutory provision, Lanham Act § 33(b)(4), contains
no mention of “likelihood of confusion” as a factor in the
226
defense.
In addition, the interpretation that gives the least
protection to the trademark owner (a feature of all four previous
cases) would favor a defense that does not depend on the absence
of confusion.
Viewing KP Permanent from the larger perspective of the four
cases, we would consider which side is best served by viewing
trademark via the unfair competition rationale. This, too, probably
favors reversal. The purpose of the fair use defense is to allow
competitors to fairly use descriptive terms in an effort to compete
in the marketplace. Upholding the defense promotes competitive
advertising of products. There is some offset here because
confusion would work to the detriment of consumers. However,
the Court may take the approach of Eldred and Park ’N Fly and defer
to Congress’s judgment about the proper balance between
promoting competition and combating confusion.
Finally, the “old millennium” case of Park ’N Fly provides some
tantalizing hints about the thinking of two justices. Justice Stevens
dissented in Park ’N Fly, asserting that descriptive marks should not
227
be considered impervious to later attack.
He also warned that
228
descriptive marks should not receive overly broad protection. His
belief would favor reversal in KP Permanent, since the fair use
defense is predicated on a competitor’s descriptive, non-trademark
use of the other’s mark. Justice Kennedy was the author of the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Park ’N Fly, which took the position that
one could defend against an infringement suit by the owner of an
225. In Wal-Mart and TrafFix the relevant statutory provision—§ 43(a) of the
Lanham Act—did not directly address the questions before the Court.
226. Moreover, the logic of the defense belies a requirement that defendant
show an absence of confusion. As stated in the body of Lanham Act § 33(b), even
the owner of an incontestable mark is required to demonstrate infringement—
which means a likelihood of confusion—in order to vindicate its exclusive right to
use the mark on the items for which it is registered. In the absence of confusion
there is no infringement (assuming no dilution claim). Thus, if there is no
confusion, no defense would be necessary, and § 33(b)(4) would appear to be
redundant.
227. Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 206-08 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 215 (“Language, even in a commercial context, properly belongs to
the public unless Congress instructs otherwise.”).
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incontestable mark by showing that the mark was descriptive and
229
If that position reflects his current
lacked secondary meaning.
belief that descriptive marks (or marks that can be used
descriptively) do not deserve broad protection, then he, too, may
favor reversal.
KP Permanent could provide interesting insights into the
direction of trademark law in the new millennium. If the Court
reads the statute strictly and reverses the Ninth Circuit, it will
strengthen the trend indicated in the four previous cases,
particularly Moseley and Dastar. The new opinion may provide
important clues about whether the unfair competition view of
trademark law evident in the four previous opinions continues to
reflect the Court’s view of the law.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the first few years of the new millennium the Supreme
Court has shown renewed interest in trademark law, deciding as
many trademark cases in four years as in the previous twenty years.
A remarkably unified Court has taken what may be termed a
“traditionalist” approach to trademark, emphasizing its roots in
unfair competition and attempting to prevent it from filling in
perceived gaps in the protection afforded by patents and
copyrights. In doing so, the Court has narrowly construed the role
of trademark and strictly construed applicable statutory provisions.
The Court also may be indicating a general unease with what it
views as a judicial intrusion into the balance between incentive and
public access inherent in our patent and copyright laws. Three of
the four new cases were based on § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, whose
expansion was largely the result of judicial action (with later
congressional acquiescence). In the fourth case, Moseley, the Court
went out of its way to hint that its expansion of trademark law
beyond its usual boundaries was not the product of a careful
legislative process that considered its effect on other intellectual
property regimes. More expansively, the Court may be signaling
that there are limits to Congress’s power to regulate these areas
under the Commerce Clause, as opposed to the Patent and
Copyright Clause.
Left unstated to this point is whether the Court’s effort to
229. Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327, 331 (9th Cir.
1983), rev’d, 469 U.S. 189 (1985).
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move trademark law back into the rubric of unfair competition and
consumer protection is a positive or negative development. That’s
a fair, but difficult, question to answer. It may be best to answer it
in stages. At the first stage, it is submitted that the results of the
four “new millennium” cases are correct. The first two were an
overdue signal to the lower courts that trademark protection for
product designs was beginning to become a serious barrier to entry
into some product markets. Dastar was a signal, albeit perhaps a
crude one, that trademark was encroaching on copyright. For half
a century the Court (largely through inattention) allowed lower
courts to use trademark law, particularly § 43(a), as a back door
means of circumventing the larger balances in patent and
copyright law, without much thought being given to the resulting
230
distortion of that balance. Only two of the Court’s late twentieth
century cases addressed this expansion, and Two Pesos in particular
simply acquiesced in the expansion, without truly considering the
overall impact on intellectual property. In short, trademark law
231
needed a bit of reigning in.
The return to an unfair competition and consumer protection
conception of trademark is not necessarily a bad thing, either.
Although the expansion of trademark law normally has paid
homage, at least in form, to protecting consumers from deceptive
232
practices, the expansion of confusion far beyond point of sale
233
confusion made such claims of deception ring a bit hollow. That,
230. Three of the four cases—Wal-Mart, TrafFix, and Dastar—are § 43(a) cases,
representing the expansion of trademark into product design and right of
attribution, potential subjects of patent and copyright law.
231. Recall that in Moseley, the Court noted pointedly that Congress apparently
had given little real thought to the expansion of trademark by the addition of
dilution protection. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003)
(recounting the legislative history of the federal dilution statute). See supra, text at
notes 136-37.
232. See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995);
Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 640 n.10 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Kohler is free to
copy Moen’s design so long as it insures that the public is not thereby deceived or
confused into believing that its copy is a Moen faucet”).
233. In the product design area, the standards for confusion virtually
guaranteed that a competitor’s copy would result in a finding of confusion. See
Welkowitz, Trade Dress and Patent, supra note 99, at 323-29. Despite its
protestations to the contrary, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Dastar, which
emphasized the defendant’s “bodily appropriation” of plaintiff’s material, Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 34 Fed. Appx. 312, 314 (9th Cir. 2002)
(using “bodily appropriation” standard, but claiming it “subsumed” confusion
standard), rev’d, 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003), similarly strays from real notions of
deception. And the dilution statute expressly disavows a need for confusion.
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however, is only stage one. A more difficult question, stage two, is
whether the Court’s reconception properly adjusts the balance
between trademark and other forms of intellectual property. Here,
234
it is worth noting that the “twin aims” of preventing consumer
deception and preventing unfair competition are not necessarily
congruent. One might believe that it is “unfair,” for example, to
compete by free riding on a market for a product created by
another (the product design problem) even in the absence of
235
confusion.
Indeed, as noted above, the KP Permanent case may
require the Court to balance the possibility of allowing some
confusion in an individual case against the larger goal of
permitting fair but free use of a mark as a descriptive device to
further competition. One also might argue that Dastar, by
eliminating, or at least severely restricting, misattribution claims,
did not do justice to consumer concerns. However, on the facts of
Dastar, it appears that the Court had well-founded fears that the
plaintiffs were less interested in proper attribution than in being
able to exact payment for defendant’s use of arguably public
236
domain material.
There is also the general concern that unfair competition is
itself a highly pliable doctrine, and thus will not be an appropriate
vehicle to alleviate the problems addressed by the Court’s recent
opinions. This concern is not entirely unfounded. Early twentieth
237
century cases noted (sometimes with approval) this very elasticity.
234. With apologies for the terminology to followers of civil procedure. See
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
235. Or, to take a more overt dilution example, one might believe it is “unfair”
to use another’s famous mark as an attention-getting device, regardless of
consumer confusion. See Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 45 (2d Cir.
1994) (upholding dilution claim under New York law against a competitor’s
advertisement using a humorous alteration of the Deere logo).
236. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041,
2049 (2003) (noting that if Dastar had given attribution it might still have been
sued). Cf. Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120-22 (1938) (Kellogg
had an obligation, which it satisfied, to use the term “shredded wheat” in a
manner that did not suggest a connection with Nabisco); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232 (1964) (though barred from making copying
actionable as unfair competition, states may require labeling of goods to avoid
consumer deception). See also Brief Amici Curiae of Intellectual Property Law
Professors in Support of Petitioner [in Dastar], republished in 24 WHITTIER L. REV.
931, 944-46 (2003). The brief suggests that a subsequent publisher of a revised
version of a work could be required to disclaim association with the original
publisher, as long as that would not result in a claim against defendants for false
association. Id. at 941-43.
237. See, e.g., Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., 7 F.2d 603, 604 (2d Cir.
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The Court’s opinion in Dastar expresses analogous concerns.
The results of recent cases, however, signal a possible answer:
emphasizing the promotion of competition, on the assumption that
239
this enhances consumer welfare. Although that assumption may
not be universally correct, it, together with labeling requirements
that do not constitute “rent” for the use of the trademark, and
which therefore do not constitute barriers to entry into the market,
may lead to reasonable accommodations between the goals of
unfair competition and those of enhancing consumer protection.
If the latter goal remains paramount, then over time an
appropriate balance may be struck.
One expects that this approach will soon face challenges from
a variety of sources. Digital media, the Internet, and the global
economy are the most immediate challengers on the horizon.
Some of these challenges will raise old issues of personal
jurisdiction and regulatory authority that will force the Court to
reexamine older precedent. Others will confront the Court with
the growing international trend toward treating trademarks as
property, in contrast to the visions espoused by the Court in its
recent jurisprudence. Whether the Court retains that current
vision of trademarks being something other than property, and the
territorial limits traditionally placed on trademark law, will define
trademark law, and perhaps intellectual property law, for many
years to come.

1925) (Hand, J.) (“there is no part of the law which is more plastic than unfair
competition, and what was not reckoned an actionable wrong 25 years ago may
have become such today”), rev’d, 273 U.S. 132 (1927). Most of the major Supreme
Court trademark opinions of that era were actually unfair competition claims,
decided as a matter of federal common law. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit
Co., 305 U.S. 111, 113 n.1 (1938); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S.
403, 411 (1916) (case “decided according to common-law principles of general
application”). But cf. A. Bourjois & Co, Inc. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923)
(upholding injunction against gray market imports under the Trademark Act of
1905).
238. Dastar, 123 S. Ct. at 2045 (§ 43(a) is not an unlimited unfair competition
statute).
239. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213-14
(2000) (lawsuits as competitive barriers).
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